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I Introduction 
The process of transforming Sub-Saharan African from State-regulated to Market-
oriented economies started in 1980 when the first group of about ten countries 
adopted World-Bank suported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). By mid 
1980s, 29 countries in the region were implementing these programmes and by end 
of 1980s and beginning of 1990s the movement towards liberalised market-oriented 
economies had gathered virtually irresistible momentum, partly spurred on by the 
collapse of the socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and increas-
ing conditionalities imposed by both bilateral and multilateral donors. 
     While modalities, and speed of implementation, and impact of economic 
reforms in Africa continue to attract considerable debate and controversy, the need 
for major reforms of African economies after three decades of tight state control, is 
no longer in much dispute. Considerable consensus seems to have emerged that 
many of the social and economic problems that have plagued the region can be at-
tributed to inappropriate and inefficient economic structures that need change: "The 
devastating problems of mass poverty, food shortages, the low productivity rates of 
the key economic sectors and the low standards of living in many of the national 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are a direct result of the production, consumption 
and employment structure, the production technologies and the socio-political 
organizations in the African countries." (Jalloh, S.B; 1993. 36) 
     This paper reviews the nature of the Sub-Saharan African economies that 
emerged after the end of the colonial era in 1960s, with special emphasis on the 
phenomenal increase in the state control on the average economy in the region and, 
discusses the rationale and the nature of economic reforms that were introduced in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The paper then explores the challenges and opportunities 
that face Africa in the transition from state-controlled to market-based economies. 
Four case studies are examined to illustrate the varied experiences of the countries in 
the region. 
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II Sub-Saharan Economies: A Historical Perspective 
The majority of Sub-Saharan Africa, especially those formerly under British and 
French colonialism, attained their independence in 1950s and 1960s, at the height of 
the ideological cold war between America and her Western European allies on the 
one hand, and the Soviet Union and her Eastern European allies on the other. The 
two super-power blocks made overt and covert efforts to win the new African na-
tions over their respective ideological camps. By the end of 1960s references were 
commonly being made on these countries as either "capitalist" or "socialist"/"com-
munist" on the basis of where they obtained economic or military support or simply 
on pronouncements made by their leaders. Consequently, countries like Kenya, 
Liberia, Nigeria among others, came to be referred to as, "capitalist" while others 
like Tanzania, Congo, Guinea, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, etc, were frequent-
ly referred to as socialist "communist", or marxist . 
     However, a close examination of the actual economic structures of most of 
the Sub-Saharan countries reveals that the differences between them were not as 
significant as the ideological labels put on them tended to suggest. In the majority of 
these countries, both the public and private sectors played important roles, a reflec-
tion that they were essentially `mixed' economies, rather than either capitalist or 
socialist in the real sense of the terms. One of the main features of mixed economies 
is that part of the productive resources is privately owned and operated while the 
other part is controlled by the public sector, the actual proportions differing from 
country to country. 
     There has been considerable debate in Africa in the last two decades of post-
independence era about the merits and demerits of private and public sectors. Pro-
ponents of an enhanced role of the private sector have held the view that the sector 
creates and facilitates more dynamism in the economy, through market forces; that 
the private sector helps to reduce the burden on the government, with the free enter-
prise system operating through an "invisible hand" as private entrepreneurs attempt 
to maximize profits; that the market forces provide a more conducing environment 
and incentives for exploitation of entrepreneurial potential in the economy while the 
public sector, more often than not, tended to stifle such potential. 
     On the other hand, the proponents of the increased role of governments in an 
economy argued that strong intervention of the government was essential and 
critical in developing economies, that it reflected the presence of political and social 
ideologies which rejected the idea of entrusting all decisions to market forces, and 
that it had been demonstrated that in developing economies market forces alone 
could not perform all economic functions in the socially desired way. This school of 
thought regarded government participation in the economy as necessary to guide, 
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correct, and supplement the market forces. 
     The superiority of free enterprise vis-a-vis state control over the economy in 
the development process is an issue that has featured considerably among the 
academics in Africa. Interesting comparison has often been made between the 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R, China and Japan, South and North Korea, Eastern and 
Western Europe, Kenya and Tanzania, and others in an attempt to show that the 
differences in economic performance between these economies were attributable to 
the adopted ideologies or economic systems. Although there are many factors which 
need to be taken into consideration before the differences can be adequately explain-
ed, there are many who believed that a market-based economic system was generally 
more conducive to rapid economic growth compared with socialist or state controll-
ed economies. The opponents of this view, however, countered it with the argument 
that some of the economic results achieved in free enterprise economic systems were 
at the expense of rising inequalities, poverty and exploitation. 
     One of the common characteristics of the majority of African economies in 
late 1970s and early 1980s, irrespective of whether they were termed "capitalist" or 
"
socialist" was the prominent role that the public sector played in these economies. 
The post-independent African leaders regarded an increased role of the public sector 
as the most effective way of rapidly changing the underdeveloped structures which 
they had inherited, (World Bank, 1981: 5; Michael Todaro, 1981). 
II. 1 The Growth of Public Enterprises in African in 1960s and 1970s 
The widely held belief about the need for an increased role of government was one 
of the contributing factors to the rapid expansion, in 1960s and 1970s, of govern-
ment ministries, departments and parastatal enterprises involved directly in the pro-
duction of goods and services. 
     The phenomenal growth of public enterprises in the first two decades of 
Africa's post-independent period can, however, be attributed to a number of other 
factors. A review of the reasons often cited to justify this growth shows that many 
of these enterprises were not established only for economic reasons but also for a 
wide range of social and political objectives. 
     As they emerged from colonialism, the majority of countries in the continent 
faced a serious shortage of local entrepreneurs with the required capital and skills to 
initiate development projects on their own. It was therefore argued that if these 
countries were to achieve rapid development without relying heavily on foreign in-
vestors, the government had to step in and play the role of an entrepreneur. 
     This led, in the majority of the countries, to the establishment of many 
parastatals engaged in productive activities and others aimed at creating the 
necessary infrastructure and acting as catalysts in the development process. In 
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Kenya, for instance, parastatals such as the Kenya Industrial Estates (K.I.E.) and In-
dustrial Commercial and Development Corporation (ICDC) were established to 
facilitate indigenisation of the economy, especially in terms of assisting local en-
trepreneurs to increase their share of the country's industrial sector. Similar reasons 
have been cited to explain growth of parastatals in many other African countries 
(Nsekela, A. S . 1974: 112). 
     Public enterprises were also created to facilitate development of sectors 
which were not attractive to private investors due to either high degree of risk involv-
ed, or low and delayed returns to the investors. There were also cases where foreign 
investors, afraid of nationalisation of their enterprises, were reluctant to invest in 
development countries unless the host government was participating as a partner. 
     In the case of economic activities which were by nature natural monopolies 
and those regarded as politically or economically strategic, governments generally 
preferred to run them as public enterprises rather than allow them to operate as 
private sector firms, fearing that consumer and national interests would be jeopardis-
ed. In Ethiopia, parastatals were seen as a means of helping the country to achieve 
economies of scale, removing duplicative activities and reducing costs and wastage 
of scarce resources (Mulat, T. 1985: 96). 
     Other economic, social and political factors which influenced the expansion 
of the role of the government in the economy, especially in terms of establishing 
parastatals in African countries were the quest for a more equitable distribution of 
incomes and a more balance regional distribution of industries, rapid diversification 
of the economies, the search for ways and means of increasing employment oppor-
tunities, and the need to provide essential goods and services to the people. This was 
regarded as crucial in view of the fact that many countries faced serious and growing 
inequalities between the rich and the poor. In some of these countries, the richest 
10 per cent of the population controlled closed to 60 per cent of the national income. 
Inequalities were readily observable in the highly skewed land and property owner-
ship, huge wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers and unequal ac-
cess to education, health and other social services, which in turn widened the gap 
even more. 
III The Rationale and Nature of Economic Reforms in Sub-Saharan 
   Africa 
Since late 1970s multilateral and bilateral donors led by the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) have held the view that the decline in economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa was largely due to structural distortions of the 
economies as a result of pursuing inappropriate economic policies such as over-
                           130
                                     The Challenges and Opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa 
valued currencies, excessive government intervention and participation in the econo-
my through inefficient public enterprises, overprotection of domestic firms, poor in-
frastructure, general lack of an enabling environment for the private sector. 
     The World Bank which emerged in 1980s and 1990s and the moving force 
behind economic reforms in Africa, argued that the public sector had become over-
extended in many of the countries, especially given these countries' scarce financial 
and skilled manpower resources as well as managerial capabilities. The Bank con-
cluded that this had "resulted in slower growth than might have been achieved with 
available resources, and accounts in part for the current crisis", (World Bank, 1981: 
5). In the Bank's view, Africa's persistent balance of payments and budgetary 
deficits, economic stagnation and insufficient investment resources for the private 
sector would have been less serious if government participation in the economy was 
reduced to facilitate a greater role for market forces. 
     While dissatisfaction with heavily government controlled economies had 
started to be voiced as far back as early 1970s, concerted criticism of government in-
tervention in the economies and the role of parastatal enterprises became more pro-
nounced in 1980s especially after the publication of the World Bank's Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action (World Bank, 1981). 
     The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which made an in-
dependent effort to design an alternative framework to Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes, came up with a programme that was not radically different. The main 
difference between the World Bank and IMF programmes on one hand and 
UNECA's on the other, was largely areas of emphasis rather than the general orien-
tation. 
     According to ECA, the World Bank and IMF had overstressed the contribu-
tion of the internal and external financial balances balance of payments, foreign ex-
change resources, budget deficits, exchange rates and inflation in their analysis of 
causes of Africa's economic crisis. According to the ECA, efforts directed mainly at 
changing the macro-economic framework were not sufficient to bring about the type 
of transformation required in the African economies for they ignored the weak pro-
duction structures, underdeveloped markets, and thus the inability of these 
economies to react to changes in the macro-economic aggregates or to market 
signals. On the basis of their analysis, the World Bank and the IMF had tended to 
develped programmes mainly focusing on short-term fiscal and monetary policy 
measures to restore the balance of payments equilibrium. 
     The ECA further argued that for countries with structural deficiencies com-
mon among the sub-saharan economies, the World Bank and IMF reform program-
mes, with emphasis on short-term restrictive budgetary policies, are not only ineffec-
tive but world have negative repercussions in terms of declining incomes, 
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deteriorating unemployment, poverty and provision of essential social services. Due 
to these weaknesses of IMF and World Bank reform programmes, many leaders in 
African were reluctant to implement them for fear of causing political and social 
unrest. It was also often argued that due to the low ability of economies to respond 
to market changes, many of the reform policies such as trade liberalization and 
devaluation do not often have the intended effects. 
III. 1 Motives and Nature of Reforms: 
From the point of view of the reforming contries, there have been two main motives 
for implementing the economic reforms. Some countries implemented reforms in 
order to stimulate economic performance through increased savings, investment and 
export earnings and to establish macro-economic stability through reduction of 
budgetary and balance of payment deficits and inflationary pressures. Some other 
countries however, introduced economic reforms mainly as a means of obtaining ex-
ternal resources as both multilateral and bilateral donors had made adoption of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes a Conditionality for gaining access to these 
resources. 
     Most of the economic reforms in Africa have focused on improving resource 
allocative mechanism and economic performance through elimination of structural 
distortions that had arisen from many years of excessive state controls. Thus, while 
there were considerable differences in areas of emphasis in the economic reforms im-
plemented in various African countries, the structural adjustment packages for most 
of the countries included common measures such as allowing market forces of supp-
ly and demand to determine exchange rates, product and factor prices; reduction or 
removal of subsidies, barriers to domestic and external trade, exchange controls, 
licensing mechanisms, budgetary and balance of payments deficits; privatisation and 
restructuring of public enterprises; and generally a reduction of the role of the 
government in the economy. 
III. 1. 1 Privatization 
Privatization of public enterprises has been one of the common reform programmes 
in many Africa countries. The rationale for privatization is based on arguments that 
privately owned and managed enterprises had generally better performance, that 
public enterprises have been grossly inefficient and were also a contributing factor to 
budgetary deficits for most Sub-Saharan African countries. 
     Estimates show that losses from public enterprises were as high as 5% of 
DGP of Sub-Saharan economies by end of 1980s. 
     In Tanzania about half of the country's public enterprises persistently record-
ed losses during 1980s while in Cameroon, the losses of public enterprises, often ex-
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ceeded the governments' total revenue from one of the country's main economic ac-
tivities (UNDP, 1993: 45-48). In Kenya, out of more than 300 public enterprises on-
ly 6 had ever declared a dividend by end of 1970s (Republic of Kenya, 1982). Persis-
tent losses by parastatals had become a major constraint for many African countries 
in their efforts to provide effective social services like health, education, sewerage 
and water because the governments had to finance the losses of the enterprises 
through subsidies. 
     Unfortunately, privatization has been extremely slow in Africa. By end of 
1991, only 373 enterprises, constituting 5% of public enterprises had been privatis-
ed, compared with 5,305 enterprises (78%) iin Eastern Europe, (UNDP, 1993: 48). 
     A wide range of factors explain this slow process of privatisation. First, 
many governments were reluctant to let go parastatals because they often served as a 
highly convenient patronage base for politicians in terms of giving the top political 
leaders opportunities to give favours, etc. in terms of tenders, promotions and ap-
pointments. Another constraint was that often there were not enough local en-
trepreneurs with adequate financial abilities to purchase the enterprises, which was 
complicated by the fact that in most of the countries it was politically sensitive to 
allow foreigners acquire these parastatals. Acquisition of public enterprises by 
foreign investors was regarded as a reversal of the indigenization process which had 
been pursued in the 1960s and 1970s. 
     In some countries, privatisation was delayed due to corrupt practices as the 
authorities sought to dispose the enterprises to their friends or other politically con-
nected people without sufficient transparency. Sometimes privatisation was delayed 
by genuine legal and valuation issues and sometimes due to lack of demand for some 
of the enterprises, especially those with poor performance record over the years. 
     The clash programme nature of privatization adopted in many countries was 
generally above the capabilities of these countries and was also a contributing factor 
to some of the weaknesses found in the privatisation process. As one of the studies 
noted: "The private sectors of African economies cannot absorb a blanket and in-
discriminate privatisation of state companies" and in many cases. They are acquired 
by multinational companies with no intention of continuing to run them, but to shut 
down the privatised plants and import similar products from their production plants 
abroad", (Jalloh, S . B . 1993: 47). 
IV Effects of the Implementation of Economic Reforms in Sub-Saharan 
   Africa: Challenges and Opportunities 
IV. 1 The Challenges to Reforms 
Africa's transition from state regulated to market-based economies in the last fifteen 
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years has confronted many challenges. Thus, inspite of the opportunities that are 
associated with attainment of an effectively liberalised economy, the process of 
creating such economies has been rather slow. Some of the challenges facing African 
countries in this process include overcoming the ideological leanings of a significant 
group of political leaders and some academics that state controls were essential in 
the development process; the small size of the private sector and indigenous en-
trepreneurship; underdeveloped infrastructure and markets which limited the supp-
ly response from various market forces; the wide-spread perception that reforms 
were externally initiated by bilateral and multilateral donors; and the short-term 
adverse effects on some of the socially vulnerable groups and infant industries. 
     Economic reform programmes in Africa have focused on the following fiscal 
adjustment, liberalization of external and domestic trade, exchange rate reforms, 
and privatisation of public enterprises and the reduction of direct government in-
volvement in the economy. Most of these, however, have not been easy to imple-
ment as they required major changes in government policies, philosophies and prac-
tices. Some of the resistance to these reforms by some politicans and other pressure 
groups can be attributed to the fact that these necessary changes in governments and 
people were sometimes not coming quickly enough. 
     As observed by the 1993 UNDP Report lack of dramatic improvement in the 
living standards of the people soon after the introduction of structural adjustment 
programmes was one of the reasons why the implementation of the reform pro-
gramme was rather sluggish: "In many countries, these reforms have yet to bear 
fruit in terms of human development. True, it is difficult to say whether their perfor-
mance would have been worse without the reforms, but the fact that three quarters 
of adjusting countries in sub-saharan Africa have suffered declining per capita in-
comes, and in Latin America the declines were at least as bad, it will be some years 
before any real balance sheet can be drawn up for the human development effects of 
liberalization and adjustment in development countries". (UNDP, 1993: 45). 
     Fiscal adjustment led to considerable reduction of government expenditures, 
removal of government subsidies, increased taxation, etc in large number of African 
countries. These and related measures adversely affected the governments' ability to 
provide various social services, which in some countries like Zambia, Algeria and 
Sudan led to political tension and riots. 
     Experience from some of the countries was that implementation of economic 
reforms, more often than not, gave rise to short-term negative impact on different 
groups. For instance, rising prices of essential commodities adversely affected con-
sumers in some of the implementing countries. Public expenditure cut especially in 
education and health reduced availability of basic needs for the poor. The 
emergence of free markets in many of the once highly regulated sectors tended to 
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create considerable pressure on the low income groups many of whom live in the 
rural areas. This was especially evident with regard to the introduction of user 
charges in hospitals, reduction or removal of subsidies, in the provision of various 
goods and services, partial cost recovery in water supply, and adjustment of interest 
rates on credit provided by public sector institutions. 
     Decontrol of consumer prices followed by spontaneous upward movement of 
the price levels reduced the purchasing power of large proportions of the popula-
tion, with the impact more pronounced among low income workers. Removal of 
price controls and subsidies had adverse effects on access to food especially for the 
rural landless poor and urban poor, undermining their nutritional status, (Ochoro 
W.E. and Omoro, F.Z., 1989: 34). People who had been used to free or highly sub-
sidized goods and services resented and sometimes vigorously resisted the changes. 
     A requirement in structural adjustment programmes for most of African 
countries was that they rationalise and reduce government expenditure. Although 
this requirement made sense in view of the countries' large budgetary deficits as a 
result of expenditures growing much more rapidly than the government's ability to 
raise revenue, it was difficult to implement these expenditure cuts without exacer-
bating human misery and related social and political problems. 
     Some governments and NGOs strongly resisted drastic reduction of public ex-
penditures. One of their arguments was that some of the main beneficiaries of the ser-
vices provided by the governments are the poor, the aged, the unemployed and 
landless who usually have no means of acquiring such services through the market 
mechanism. It was argued that in the early stage of development, the government 
must be responsible for laying both the social and economic infrastructure which 
would in the long-run facilitate efficient operation of market forces. Curtailment of 
government's ability to finance infrastructure and participate in economic activities 
would be counterproductive and derail or at least slow the development process. 
     Many Africans have had to introduce cost sharing programmes with the ob-
jective of making beneficiaries of public services to pay part of the cost. Although 
this move is perhaps inevitable, there has been the difficult question of its effect on 
the poor groups who may not be able to pay their share of the cost. There have been 
fears that some of the economic reforms could aggravate inequality among various 
socio-economic groups, which was already a major area of concern in the Sub-
Saharan region. Cost-sharing in areas such as education and health was likely to 
make it difficult for the poor to improve their standard of living and thus widen the 
gap between the poor and the rich. 
     Although there has been a tendency to associate economic reforms with 
adverse effects on the poor, this is not always the case. There is therefore need for a 
more balanced analysis of the impact of structural adjustment on the poor, taking in-
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to account both positive and negative effects. If one considers poor households as a 
unit, negative effects may include increased expenditures on health services and 
school fees due to cost sharing; loss of income earning in the household because of 
retrenchment. 
     On the other hand, positive effects associated with reforms include better 
availability of cheap second-hand clothing resulting from liberalisation of imports; 
stable prices on consumer goods due to inflation control and lower prices on certain 
food items, e.g. maize meal due to deregulation of markets, among others. Making 
quantitative calculation in this manner at the household level helps to establish who 
are winners and losers from the multiple elements contained in the structural adjust-
ment package. Without this no authoritative judgement can be made about the 
overall impact of structural adjustment reforms on the poor. 
     Secondary, it is essential to differentiate between short-term and long-term 
effects. There has been a tendency to concentrate on the negative short term effects 
and ignore potential long term positive impact on the economy as a while as well as 
on various socio-economic groups including the low income groups. 
     Thirdly, a careful distinction should always be made between what will ac-
company structural adjustment by necessity in the short-term by way of hardships, 
and those effects which arise from poor design and imperfect implementation of the 
reforms. For instance, if the government fails to curb interference in trade liberalisa-
tion by powerful and politically well connected interest groups, the effects should 
not be blamed on the policy of liberalisation per se. Corruption and inefficiency may 
have considerable influence on implementation, but should not be construed to be 
part and parcel of the structural adjustment programme. For instance, the collapse 
of a number of garment manufacturing firms in Kenya during 1994-95 was largely a 
consequence of importation of finished garments by politically connected people, 
without paying import duty, rather than liberalisation per se. 
     One of the factors which reduced the effectiveness of trade liberalization in 
these countries was lack of necessary support from macro-economic policies. Some 
of the countries tried to carry out trade liberalization without effectively implemen-
ting other necessary macro-economic policy measures such as monetary policy 
reforms. 
     Trade liberalization also made it difficult to reduce budgetary deficits for 
some of the countries because of lower revenue from import tariffs, one of the main 
sources of revenue for many African economies. Some of these negative effects 
were, however, mainly short term in nature and could be removed in the long-run 
when the positive effects of liberalization process are more entrenched. 
     In order to increase the production of exports, it was necessary for govern-
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ments to ensure credit availability. This was also not easy for many developing coun-
tries due to a number of factors including the underdevelopment of money and 
capital markets and the often intense competition between the government and the 
private sector for the limited available credit resources. Heavy government reliance 
on borrowing from the domestic banking system had been depriving private sector 
entrepreneurs of credit facilities. 
     It has also been observed that if governments' commitment to trade liberaliza-
tion policy was not strong, it discouraged entrepreneurs from reallocation of 
resources to export production. In some countries, the government authorities 
preferred a slow and gradual approach to liberalisation which created doubts about 
the government's intentions strengthening resistance from forces opposed to 
economic liberalisation (Deepak Lal, 1987: p. 275-276). This overall effect of this 
was to discourage reallocation of resources to the targeted export sectors. 
     Attempts to liberalize trade in sub-saharan Africa has in many cases met 
strong opposition from local manufacturers who argued that removing protection 
on local industries would make it difficult for a large proportion of these industries 
to survive. The excess capacity existing in many sectors of the Kenyan industry, for 
instance, is often attributed to liberalization of imports. It is, however, important to 
note that while some African businessmen were opposed to trade liberalization and 
other reform measures, there were others who strongly supported the reforms, argu-
ing that controls in the economy had a stifling effect on the economy (Ikiara G.K., 
1994). 
IV. 2 Opportunities 
Inspite of the obstacles faced by Sub-Saharan African countries in their effort to 
transform their economies to market economies, there are clear indications of the 
potential and opportunities that are possible from more liberalized and restructured 
economic systems in the African region. A 1994 World Bank report on seven case 
studies, shows that countries which had vigorously implemented economic reform 
programmes experienced considerable improvements in their economic perfor-
mance, although there was a wide variation from one country to the other. 
     Some of the achievements included positive changes in the countries' overall 
policy environment in most of these countries which had embarked on the reform 
programmes, with the most impressive success being recorded in macro-economic 
and agricultural reforms. This was especially so for those countries which did not 
maintain fixed exchange rates. Liberalisation of domestic markets had also been fair-
ly successful although not in all the countries. 
     Areas in which economic reforms were less successful were privatization of 
parastatal enterprises and liberalisation of the financial markets due to strong 
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resistance to change exhibited in those activities. The World Bank, however, con-
cluded from the seven country case studies that "The reform programs work: In 
countries and policy areas where policy performance has been reasonably good, the 
outcomes have been reasonably good; conversely, poor policy reform progress has 
been reflected in poor performance, (World Bank, 1994; 1). Some of the reforms 
undertaken so far have been welcomed by the business community especially in 
terms of improving the environment in which they operate. The reforms which have 
been particularly welcomed by the business communities in Africa include removal 
of exchange controls, trade licensing, deregulation of both product and factor prices 
and privatization of some parastatals or restructuring some of the activities of these 
enterprises. The business community, in countries like Kenya, have been agitating 
for removal of the above regulations since 1970s because of the negative effects they 
had on the overall business environment, (Ikiara, G.K, 1994). 
     Among the complaints against these state controls were that they encouraged 
excessive bureaucracy, corruption, delays, favouritism and inability to have a level-
paying field for fair business competition based on quality and pricing of products. 
Thus, although these problems still exist in many countries, there have been 
noticeable improvements in those economic aspects which have been effectively 
liberalized. The removal of price controls, licensing and foreign exchange controls 
has reduced some of the areas red-type that businessmen had to through. 
     As mentioned in an earlier part of this paper, structural adjustments program-
mes have in some cases had positive impact on the low income groups, contrary to 
the commonly held view that SAPs hurt the vulnerable groups. One of the benefits 
from import liberalisation for the poor in some African countries is improved access 
to cheaper goods as a result of increased competition between domestic and im-
ported products. For instance, following liberalisation of grain marketing in Kenya 
in 1994, the consumer price of maize, staple food item for the majority of Kenyans; 
fell by about two-thirds from Kshs. 1500 to Kshs. 500 per 90-kg bag. This was major 
relief for the low income people in the country. Removal of restrictions on imports 
and reduction of tariffs on imported textile products also led to an inflow of cheap 
clothing into the country, enabling a large proportion of the poor to afford more de-
cent clothing. However, while some of these benefits of liberalization are significant, 
the trade offs must be taken into consideration to enable a country to compute costs 
and benefits in order to make the appropriate decisions. 
IV. 3 Selected Country Experiences with Reforms 
IV. 3.1 Ghana 
Ghana is rated as one of the leading countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of its 
implementation of sweeping economic reforms. The country adopted an Economic 
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Recovery Programme in 1983 which involved decontrol of consumer prices, 
liberalization of external trade, devaluation of the domestic currency financial 
market reforms, tax reforms and elimination of subsidies. 
     The results of these reforms show that by early 1990s, there were positive, 
though not very dramatic signs of economic growth. After decades of stagnation, 
the real GDP growth rate rose to about 5 YO per annum for the period 1984-91 
(UNDP, 1993). By 1990, investment had risen to 15 °/ of Gross Domestic Product by 
1990; the private sector had started to respond to the reform program with private in-
vestment rising from 4% in 1984 to 8 Yo of GDP. By 1991, private sector investment 
constituted 50% of total investments in the country. 
     But as UNDP report notes about the Ghanian economic recovery "... con-
sidering the decline of the economy in 1970s and early 1980s and the growth of the 
population, the recovery is only modest and has not yet been translated into improv-
ed living conditions for the majority of the people", (UNDP, 1993: 58). 
    While being critical of SAPs Jalloh, in his study of the reform programme in 
sub-Saharan Africa, concludes that in the Ghanian case, the successes of the reform 
policy in reversing the economic decline were more than the adverse effects (Jalloh, 
S.B, 1993: 44). 
IV. 3. 2 Gambia 
The Gambian economy experienced sharp deterioration in its economic perfor-
mance in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially after the oil shocks of 1973 and 
1979. The country's poor economic performance was reflected in the sharp fall in its 
per capita income and deterioration in its balance of payment deficits, budgetary 
deficits and foreign debt arrears. 
     The country was forced to request stabilization and structural adjustment 
loans from the World Bank and the IMF, who demanded that economic reforms be 
undertaken before the loans could be granted. These demands prompted the coun-
try to launch one of the most sweeping and comprehensive economic reforms in 
Africa in mid-1985 under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and, later in 
1990, under the Programme for Sustained Development (PSD). 
     Although the ERP programme focused more on fiscal reforms, it also incor-
porated public-sector, trade and financial reforms and included a wide range of 
policy measures. Fiscal reform measures of the ERP implemented between 1995 and 
1988 included abolition of export taxes; rationalization of import tariffs; abolition 
of import tax and rationalization or abolition of some other miscellaneous domestic 
taxes and duties; introduction of sales tax; a 20% reduction of public sector employ-
ment and freezing of public sector wages; reduction of total public expenditures; im-
provement in budget accounting system and simplification of income tax schedules. 
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     The public sector reforms implemented during this period were privatization, 
introduction of parastatal `performance contracts' to enhance efficiency and major 
administrative reforms of government ministries. The trade and financial reforms in-
cluded devaluation of the domestic currency, liberalization of foreign exchange 
market, decontrol of domestic interest rates, establishment of targets for money 
supply control, and tax reforms. 
     The PSD Programme implemented between 1990 and 1992 aimed at entren-
ching the measures implemented in 1985. Thus, fiscal reforms of 1990 were aimed at 
increasing public infrastructure, preparation of public expenditure programmes in 
areas such as education and health, computerization of customs and income tax ad-
ministration, reduction of company taxation from 75 °/ to 50% of profits and index-
ation of income tax brackets, widening and strangthening income and sales tax 
bases, improving tax collection and compliance and introducing discretionary aboli-
tion duty waivers. 
     Under the PSD public sector reforms, measures taken were: further privatisa-
tion of public enterprises, introduction of user charges in education and health, ex-
tension of performance contracts' improvement of public-sector management 
liberalization of the market and removal of the monopoly that the Ghanaian Pro-
fuce and Marketing Board (GPMB) had hitherto enjoyed in the distribution and 
marketing of some of the agricultural produce in the country. 
     Trade and financial reforms carried out during this period were abolition of 
government guarantees for private sector borrowers, privatization of foreign ex-
change bureaux and abolition of credit ceilings in the country (Basu, P and Gemmel, 
N., 1993: 4). 
     Like in many other reform programmes in Africa, the emphasis of the Gam-
bian ERP was on increasing efficiency and reducing fiscal deficits, with low attention 
given to equity issues. ERP contained virtually no measures aimed specifically at 
distributional or poverty issues reflecting the fact that the Government and lending 
institutions in the early 1980s were mainly preoccupied with efforts to reduce in-
efficiencies in the economy, (Basu, P. and Gemmel, N., 1993: 7). This weakness was, 
rectified to some extent in the early 1990s under PSD when distributional issues were 
given greater attention. 
The Impact on the Gambian Economy 
In terms of the growth of GDP, the impact of the reform programme was to some ex-
tent ambiguous. While the average annual growth rates of GDP in the first two to 
three years of the post-reform period was higher than that of the first three years 
before the reforms, the average annual growth rates of GDP in the fourth year of 
the pre-reform period were higher than that in the fourth year of the post-reform 
                           140
                                    The Challenges and Opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa 
period. Thus, the average annual GDP growth rate recorded in the period, 1980-85 
before reforms was 4.0 °/ while the corresponding figure for the period 1985-90 was 
3.6% (Table 1). It should, however, be noted that full assessment of the contribu-
tion of the reform programme was rather difficult because of lack of counterfactual 
data for the post-reform period, when a longer time frame is taken into considera-
tion. It was, therefore, unclear whether GDP growth rates would have been higher 
or lower if the country had not implemented the reform programme. 
     Basu, P and Gemmel, N. in their study (1993) of the impact of reform pro-
gramme in Gambia found that many objectives of the reforms were achieved. These 
included significant reduction of Government budget deficit; increase in tax revenue 
in both absolute terms and as a proportion to GDP; rationalization of tax system in 
terms of elimination of export taxes, import duties and excise taxes, and reduction 
of the number of tariff bands undertaken in the period 1985-88; rationalization of in-
direct taxes, with the introduction of sales tax; widening of the country's tax base; 
significant reduction of current account deficits and debt arrears. 
     Other achievements of the reforms included improvement in the efficiency of 
the public sector, growth of the services sector especially tourism which benefitted 
from the depreciation of the local currency in 1986. 
     Perhaps because of the extent to which the Gambian Government was involv-
ed in the design of the reform programme, the liberalization of the economy was im-
plemented voluntarily and experienced little open political resistance or social unrest 
contrary to the experience of a large number of other African countries. One of the 
possible explanations for the absence of political resistance to implementation of the 
reform programme was that there were no major subsidies to the poor groups in 
Gambia before the introduction of the reforms. "Thus whereas in several other refor-
ming countries, the removal of such subsidies has been an important part of reform-
Table 1 Gambian GDP Growth Rates Before and After the Economic Recovery Pro-
       gramme (ERP)
Pre-EP Post-ERP No. of Years
Period GDP growth (%) Period GDP growth (%)
1984-85 1.6 1985-86 4.1 1
1983-85 3.3 1985-87 3.5 2
1982-85 2.7 1985-88 2.9 3
1981-85 6.7 1985-89 3.2 4
1980-85 4.0 1985-90 3.6 5
1985-91 3.4 6
1985-92 3.5 7
Source: Basu, P. and Gemmel, N. 1993-28.
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ing fiscal deficits, such socially painful measures were largely avoided in Gambia" 
(Basu, P and Gemmel, N. 1993: 30). The fact that the Government took measures to 
reduce the negative effects of reforms by increasing the producer prices and to 
relocate the workers retrenched from the public sector was another factor which fur-
ther explains lack of strong opposition to the programme in Gambia. 
IV. 3.3 Kenya 
In the last five years Kenya has moved from a highly state - controlled economy 
characterized by price controls, marketing restrictions, quantitative restriction, and 
high government participation in the economy, to a relatively free market economy. 
Much of this has been effected through economic liberalization measures im-
plemented within the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs). 
     Before 1985, the government regulated virtually all facets of the financial, fac-
tor, goods and services markets, with more than 70 percent of all prices in the goods 
market under government control. The mechanism of determining price levels and 
keeping surveillance over illegal changes was complex and often beyond the ability 
of the available government resources. Interest rates and exchange rates were con-
trolled by the government through the Central Bank with market forces playing an 
insignificant role. 
     The government participated directly in many economic activities ranging 
from farming, manufacturing, banking, services, to commercial business and ser-
vices usually through parastatal enterprises. Over 50 percent of the country's invest-
ment was undertaken by the government either directly or through parastatals enter-
prises. 
     But by the beginning of 1995, the situation had radically changed, the govern-
ment having removed restrictions on marketing of agricultural commodities, and 
determination of interest rates and foreign exchange rates. Considerable efforts had 
been made to establish the necessary policy measures for controlling budget deficit 
through expenditure reductions, modernization of revenue collection, restructuring 
of the civil service and divesting from regular commercial activities. As part of the 
budget rationalization, the government introduced user charges in virtually all its ser-
vices. The general trend has been to move towards charging market prices for goods 
and services which continue to be provided by public enterprises or institutions. 
Thus, Kenya, like many other African countries, has been in the process of breaking 
off from three decades of government-controlled economy to a market-oriented 
economy. 
     Since 1980 the country has been moving, though reluctantly and intermittent-
ly, towards a more market-oriented economy, away from the policies pursued in the 
previous two decades of post-independence period which sought to enhance the role 
                            142
                                    The Challenges and Opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa 
of the public sector. This change in policy has been, however, more seriously im-
plemented in the 1990s then in 1980s when the spirit and pace of implementation of 
the economic reforms were low. 
     Kenya was among the first group of Sub-Saharan African countries which 
adopted Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1980. This was a turning point 
for the country, marking a clear break with the economic policies which had been 
pursued since 1963. At the end of 70 years of British Colonial role in 1963, the newly 
independent country pursued economic policies aimed at rapidly raising the role of 
government in the economy. A mixed economy in which both the public and private 
sectors played an important role in the development process was embraced as the 
most appropriate strategy to tackle the prevailing economic problems especially the 
control of the economy by non-indigenous investors, poverty, unemployment and 
various income groups of people (Republic of Kenya, 1965). 
     However, by mid 1970s this interventionist approach to development 
characterized by price controls, state monopolies, exchange rate restrictions, sub-
sidies, direct state participation in various economic sectors had proved a con-
siderable disappointment. The cumbersome task of policing producers and mid-
dlemen to ensure that controls were maintained became increasingly difficult as 
premiums in the market place increased, encouraging the growth of parallel markets 
and corruption in the country's body politic. From the 1980s the government em-
barked on selective removal of price controls, beginning with non-essential con-
sumer and producer commodities. 
     By the beginning of 1990s the implementation of economic reforms agreed 
with IMF and World Bank was still poor as the government was still reluctant to im-
plement some of the measures. Between 1990 and 1991, progress in the implementa-
tion of reform measures was slow and inadequate in many fronts including public 
sector reform, fiscal discipline, privatization and financial stability. The perfor-
mance of the economy had also deteriorated in many aspects. In addition to rising 
levels of corruption, poor governance, slow process of democratization were also 
emerging as issues of concern not only for the donors and foreign ministries but also 
many Kenyans. This culminated in suspension of aid to the country by donors in 
November 1991. The suspension, together with growing discontent of the donors 
and the populace, compelled the government to re-negotiate for a new structural ad-
justment program. During the period between November 1992 and end of 1994, 
radical reform measures were undertaken as the government tried to improve its rela-
tionship with the donor community to facilitate resumption of foreign assistance. 
     Thus, Kenya's economic reform process can be categorized in three fairly 
distinct phases: (i) 1980-84; (ii) 1985-91 (iii) 1992-95. In the first two phases, im-
plementation of the reforms was slow and uncoordinated, with limited willingness 
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and commitment from top political leadership. Review of the government record in 
implementation of the agree reforms such as liberalization of import trade, domestic 
trade, marketing, removal of price control, reduction of government deficit 
parastatal, and others, shows that the government did not seriously `own' the 
reforms which were to be implemented. As a recent World Bank publication 
observes: "first adjustment attempt (1980-84) was marked by a total lack of com-
pliance, partly because of design and timing problems, but also because the commit-
ment to the stated policy changes was limited to a coterie of top civil servants... Even 
in the second period... (1985-91), when much more effort went into building a 
broader consensus, the pace was incremental, and the commitment of top officials 
waxed and waned" (World Bank, 1994). 
     While a small number of top civil service technocrats agreed with the World 
Bank and the IMF officials about the need for certain reforms, the political leader-
ship was largely opposed to reforms. Largely as a result of pressure from the donors 
the country has not only virtually liberalised all aspects of the economy including 
removal of all price controls, exchange rate controls, liberalised both external and 
domestic trade, embarked on serious privatisation and restructuring of parastatals 
and public service reforms involving retrenchment of about 90,000 civil servants, 
but also undertook substantial political reforms including introduction of a multi-
party political system after about 26 years of single-party rule. 
IV. 3. 4 Tanzania 
By late 1970s, Tanzania had emerged as one of the most well known socialist coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa following the 1967 Arusha Declaration which led to 
wholesale nationalization of large and medium - sized enterprises in all the key sec-
tors of the economy and collectivization of small scale peasant farms. By the mid 
1970s, The Tanzanian economy was heavily dominated by the government, with 
private sector enterprises seriously stifled. After a short period, 1967-73, in which 
the governments actions seemed to be having positive impact in terms of impressive 
GDP growth rates of about 5 per cent per annum, an increase in the flow of external 
donor resources, a rise in the grow investment above 20 percent of the GDP, the 
economy's weaknesses came to the fore in early 1980s. These weaknesses were 
reflected in falling productivity of public enterprises which affected the key sectors, 
declining savings and export competitiveness and serious deterioration in private sec-
tor confidence. These problems were compounded by the onset of the oil crises of 
1970s, adverse effects from a devastating drought, collapse of the East African Com-
munity in 1977 and the war with Uganda (World Bank, 1994: 352) 
     These factors caused a major decline in the economy which started in the se-
cond half of 1970s and intensified in the early 1980s. For instance the GDP annual 
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growth rate declined continuously for the period 1981-83, with the industrial sector 
experiencing very hard times. The country's industrial output was falling by about 
15 °/ per annum and the sector's average capacity utilization declined to only 25 °/ 
of the installed capacity. This decline in the economic fortunes was also reflected in 
the deterioration in various macro-indicators, such as balance of payments 
budgetary deficits and rising inflation. 
     After half-hearted efforts to liberalize the economy failed to arrest the rapidly 
deepening economic crises of early 1980s, serious reform measures were first under-
taken in 1986. The reform measures implemented then included liberalization of ex-
change rate, improvement of agriculture producer prices especially for the country's 
main export commodities, trade liberalization and export promotion. 
     While the Tanzanian economy cannot be said to have come out of the 
economic crisis completely, it has made substantial recovery. Evaluation of the im-
pact of the adjustment programme in Tanzania shows that the country's economic 
performance has turned round dramatically as a result of the programme. This im-
provement was reflected in restoration of economic growth, a rise in the levels of 
both exports and investments and reduction of the budgetary deficit and rate of infla-
tion. (World Bank, 1994: 355-6). Other indicators show that economic performance 
during the first five years of the reform period was much better than the previous five 
years before the introduction of the reforms. In many cases, the performance of the 
economy during the reform period was also better than the period 1970-80 before 
the onset of the crisis period, 1981-85 (Table 2). 
V Concluding Remarks 
Although the nature, speed and impact of economic liberalisation on sub-Saharan 
African continue to attract debate, there is considerable consensus that the region's 
economies need some restructuring if they are to cope with current and future socio-
economic challenges. Economic problems that have afflicted African countries since 
1970s have been increasingly attributed to inappropriate economic structures and in-
spite of opposition to reforms from a number of groups and reluctance in implemen-
tation by some governments, there is no doubt that the last fifteen years have witness-
ed significant transformation of Africa's economies from heavy state regulations 
market economies. 
     However, while the structural adjustment programme requirements are 
generally desirable and useful, the pace of reform implementation is one area that re-
quires more careful consideration. In addition it is important to recognize that 
given the rather special responsibilities that the public sector has held in many 
African countries, the reduction of government participation in their economies can-
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Table 2 Selected indicator of economic recovery program achievements.
Indiator
Average annual GDP growth in real terms 
Average annual export growth in real terms 
Investment as a percent of GDP 
Average annual inflation rate 
Fiscal deficit as percent of GDP 
Primary fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP 
Agricultural producer prices as a percentage 
 of international prices 
Average annual appreciation of the real 
 exchange rate 
Central government deficit as a percent of 
 GDP 
Current account deficit as a percent of GDP 
Gross domestic investment as a percent of 
 GDP 
Gross domestic savings as a percentage of 
 GDP Official 
Including unofficial exports
Pre-crisis period 





















   9.4 





















Source: World Bank,. 1994 P. 356
not be carried out overnight without serious human, economic and political reper-
cussions. A more realistically scheduled reform programme taking into account 
each country's special circumstances and implementation capacity would help to 
ameliorate short-term social, economic and political adverse effects and make the 
transition to a market-based economy relatively easier. 
     Africa's experience shows that while donor assistance and resources are im-
portant in the economic recovery programme of African countries, mobilisation of 
domestic resources is more important especially in the medium and long-term 
perspectives. The reform process must seek ways and means of stimulating and 
enhancing active participation of domestic actors in the economy. 
     The observed opposition to economic reform programmes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, is not always a reflection of unwillingness to adopt reforms per se. This at-
titude is often based on some of the weaknesses in both the design and implementa-
tion of structural adjustment programmes. For instance, the fact that most of the 
programmes have been externally initiated and supported has often given the impres-
sion that these programmes undermine a country's independence in economic deci-
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sion-making. This impression has tended to be reinforced by the often coercive 
nature of the implementation of the programmes by donor organisations in some 
countries in their efforts to ensure that performance criteria are achieved before 
financial assistance is availed to the adjusting countries. 
     The initial reform programmes in many countries did not give sufficient atten-
tion to the impact on human and social conditions, especially the issue of access to 
essential services such as education, health, nutrition and housing to the low income 
and other disadvantaged groups. This has however, changed in recent years, 
especially following strong criticism from bodies such as UNICEF (Cornia, G.A., 
Jolly, R. and Stewart, F. 1988). 
     Other factors that have tended to reduce enthusiasm for structural adjust-
ment programmes in Africa were the widespread apprehensions about the adverse 
impact of the reform policies, especially trade liberalisation, on Africa's in-
dustrialization process and the criticisms that the structural adjustment was too 
much focused on short-term fiscal and monetary stablization issues, while neglecting 
domestic and infrastructural issues that have emerged as major bottlenecks in the 
development process of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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